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I. INTRODUCTION
The case, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do
Vegetal,' [hereinafter 0 Centro] provides the disturbing result that
any person who is, or becomes, a member of a particular church is
permitted to use an otherwise illegal hallucinogenic drug, hoasca, be-
cause of his or her religious affiliation.2 The drug hoasca contains
DMT,3 which, under the Controlled Substances Act, is a Schedule One
drug.4 This means that the drug is not approved for any medicinal
use and falls into the same category as drugs such as cocaine, mari-
juana, and methamphetamines.5 Further, the classification of this
drug is not merely arbitrary as there are scientific studies that show
that it causes serious adverse effects, including the inability to focus
and perceptual distortions including hallucinations.6
Overall, the Supreme Court's departure from existing free exercise
precedent in 0 Centro is inappropriate, may lead to the evisceration of
the Controlled Substances Act, and certainly will lead to inconsistent
results in similar claims. Under the applicable legal standard, the
"compelling interest test" that is required under the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA),7 and at one time was the Supreme
Court's established precedent,S the Court has never granted a relig-
ious group the right to use otherwise illegal drugs for religious pur-
poses.9 Further, the Court did not fully consider the overall impact of
the precedent created by this decision on the enforcement of the Con-
1. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
2. Id.
3. DMT is an abbreviation for the drug dimethyltryptamine.
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
5. § 812.
6. See Alicia B. Pomilio et al., Cult-Hoasca: A Model for Schizophrenia, MOLECULAR
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY, Jul.-Sept. 2003 (noting that among other effects, hoasca
creates the inability to focus and "perceptual distortions," including illusions).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
8. § 2000bb
9. See C.T. Foster, Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion as Defense to Prosecution
for Narcotic or Psychedelic Drug Offense, 35 A.L.R.3d 939 (1971) (noting that the
overall chances of winning such a case are slim to none). Federal courts have
expanded a regulatory exemption for peyote intended only for Native Americans
to other religious users of peyote under the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment but not under RFRA. See Native American Church of New
York v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 1247, 1251 (D.C.N.Y. 1979), affd, 633 F.2d
205 (2d Cir. 1980).
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trolled Substances Act,1o which would not be substantially harmed by
a single exemption, but would be greatly harmed by many exemptions.
Finally, the Supreme Court ensured that there would be inconsistent
results in future RFRA claims related to drug use by leaving the dis-
trict courts to determine how harmful an illegal drug must be before a
claimant is not permitted to use it.11
Section III.A analyzes the compelling interest test as it is applied
in the free exercise context prior to 1990 and points out how 0 Centro
is inconsistent with this precedent. Then, section III.B explores the
destructive influence of the Court's failure to weigh the future impact
of the exemption on the Controlled Substances Act caused by the Su-
preme Court's failure to adequately consider the effect of this case on
precedent. Finally, section III.C explains why it is imprudent for the
Supreme Court to allow federal district courts to determine RFRA free
exercise claims for drug usage without further guidance than is pro-
vided in 0 Centro.
II. HISTORY: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
AND ITS HISTORICALLY BASED MEANING
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act [hereinafter RFRA], as ap-
plied in 0 Centro, was drafted in response to Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith12 [hereinafter
Smith], which decreased the Constitutional protection of the First
Amendment free exercise right by changing the standard of review on
such claims.13 The purpose of the Act was to provide increased protec-
tion to free exercise claimants by making it more difficult for the gov-
ernment to enforce laws that infringe upon religious practices. Prior
to Smith, the explicit standard of review for a free exercise claim had
been more favorable to claimants, as evidenced in Sherbert v. Verner14
and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 15 RFRA was Congress' attempt to "turn back
the clock" to Sherbert and Yoder.
A. The Beginning up to Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder
Sherbert v. Verner16 and Wisconsin v. Yoder 1 7 set forth the "com-
pelling interest" test that is now the applicable test under the
10. The Supreme Court previously performed this sort of analysis in United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
11. See discussion infra section IV.C.
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
17. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
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RFRA.18 Prior to these cases, the Supreme Court had adopted a posi-
tion that the "freedom to believe" should be protected but the "freedom
to act" should not be. 19 Then during the 1940s and 1950s, the Court
struck down laws which interfered with the right to act in conformity
with religious beliefs because the laws interfered with free speech
rights. 20 The Supreme Court then broke with earlier precedent in the
Sherbert and Yoder decisions by extending protection to certain relig-
iously motivated actions under the free exercise clause, even though
these actions would otherwise be unlawful.2 1 In these cases, the
Court used the compelling interest test to balance the interests of the
government in having a law upheld versus the interests of a claimant
in practicing his religion.
The compelling interest test is designed to measure whether a law
(that is not designed to discriminate against religious practices) cre-
ates an "undue burden" on the religious practices of the claimant. In
the first step, the claimant must show that the law interferes with his
religion by requiring him to perform an act which his religion prohib-
its or the law prohibits him from performing an act which his religion
requires.2 2 For example, the claimant met this requirement in Sher-
bert where an unemployment law required her to be available to work
on Saturday to be eligible for benefits, but her religious beliefs re-
quired her to worship and not work on Saturday.23 However, the re-
quirement is not met when a law indirectly makes it more costly to
practice a certain religion. For example, in McGowan v. Maryland,24
a Jewish shopkeeper's economic hardship due to Sunday closing laws
was not sufficient to meet this requirement, even though his religion
required him to also close his store on Saturday, and thus only be open
five days per week, whereas the Christian shopkeepers could have
their stores open six days a week.2 5 In the second step, the claimant
must show that the practice at issue is central to the religion and that
his belief is sincerely held.26 This is largely subjective, but tends to
root out claims where the claimant engages in an illegal activity
where the religion permits, or suggests the activity, but does not re-
quire it.27 Finally, the government bears the burden of proving that
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
19. Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CA. L. REV. 1709, 1713
(2000) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)).
20. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1285 (6th ed.
2000).
21. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
22. NowAK, supra note 20, at 1377.
23. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
24. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
25. 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961).
26. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (examining whether the Amish belief that children
should not attend school beyond the eighth grade is central to the religion).
27. See Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the conflicting law is the least restrictive means of accomplishing a
compelling government interest. 28 In this part of the test, the Court
weighs the government's asserted interest against that of the free ex-
ercise claimant. 29 The Court used this test in Sherbert and Yoder and
continued to apply it explicitly until Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources, Oregon v. Smith.30
In Sherbert, the Court held that the claimant must receive unem-
ployment benefits even though she was unable to fulfill all the eligibil-
ity requirements due to her religious beliefs.31 The claimant, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, lost her job when she was required to work on
Saturday, but could not do so because her religious beliefs required
her to worship on Saturday.3 2 The unemployment law came into di-
rect conflict with the woman's beliefs since it required her to be availa-
ble for work on Saturdays in order to receive benefits. 33 The Court
held that the State's interest in preventing people from fraudulently
claiming a religious exemption and collecting unemployment was not
sufficiently compelling to justify denying a practicing Seventh-Day
Adventist unemployment funds.
3 4
In Yoder, Amish parents claimed "that their children's attendance
at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion
and way of life ... [because the children] would not only expose them-
selves to the danger of the censure of the church community, but...
also endanger their own salvation and that of their children."3 5 The
Court concluded that the law that required the Amish children to at-
tend school was a substantial burden on their free exercise, primarily
for the aforementioned reasons,3 6 and then noted that there were
other, less restrictive, means through which the Amish were accom-
plishing the State's goal of educating children to be good citizens, "self-
reliant" and "self-sufficient."3 7 The Court decided that the Amish es-
sentially fulfilled the purpose of the education law by providing an
education sufficient for Amish life.38
28. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
29. See id.
30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963).
32. Id. at 399.
33. Id. at 403-04.
34. Id. at 406-07.
35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
36. Id. at 215-19.
37. Id. at 221, 234-35.
38. Id. at 235-36.
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B. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources,
Oregon v. Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources, Oregon v.
Smith39 substantially altered the Supreme Court's approach to free
exercise. This decision eliminated the compelling interest test which
had previously been the accepted standard in free exercise cases.40
Instead, the Court decided that in a "pure" free exercise claim, a ra-
tional basis test would apply.4 1 This is a dramatically lower standard
of review because it only requires that the Court to find that the law is
"otherwise valid."42
The defendants asserted a free exercise defense against the en-
forcement of Oregon laws prohibiting the use of peyote by arguing that
smoking peyote was an essential part of their Native American relig-
ious practices.4 3 The Court upheld the Oregon law stating that it had
never before allowed a free exercise exemption to a law that was "neu-
tral."44 Specifically, the Court noted that it had "never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an oth-
erwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate."45
The Court analyzed free exercise precedent (including Sherbert
and Yoder) and noted that the only time that it had invalidated "neu-
tral, generally applicable law[s]" was when another constitutional
right was asserted along with Free Exercise. 46 The Court noted that
some of these other constitutional rights included freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of association, and parents' rights "to
direct the education of their children" as upheld in Yoder.47 The Court
also rejected the appellants' contention that the strict scrutiny stan-
dard from Sherbert should apply in the case. 48 The Court explained
that in recent years, it had only applied the Sherbert precedent in the
context of unemployment compensation and had purposely not applied
it in other types of free exercise cases. 49 The Court also noted that
even at the time when the test was used outside of the unemployment
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. Id. at 878-79.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Idat 874-75.
44. Id. at 877-78.
45. Emp. Div., Dep't of Human Res., Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
46. Id. at 881.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 882-83.
49. Id. at 883.
[Vol. 86:987
DRUG USE AND RELIGION
context the Court had never invalidated any law other than an unem-
ployment compensation law. 50
The Supreme Court explained further that it refused to use the
"strict scrutiny" test for Free Exercise claims standing by themselves
because it would lead to "anarchy:"
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied
across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreo-
ver, if "compelling interest" really means what it says (and watering it down
here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws
will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diver-
sity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of
them.
5 1
The Court was concerned that any application of the compelling inter-
est test in a pure free exercise context would unjustifiably overextend
religious freedom with the consequence of destroying law and order.5 2
Congress did not accept the Court's reasoning. The Supreme Court
did not specifically overrule previous free exercise precedent, but it
substantially reinterpreted free exercise precedent so that it appeared
to be less favorable to free exercise rights than before. 5 3 In response
to this decision, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. 54 The purpose of the law, as set forth in its text, is to restore the
compelling interest test.55 The Act further provided that the test in
Sherbert and Yoder is the appropriate test.56 The Senate Judicial
Committee Report stated that the law is "the restoration of the legal
standard that was applied in [previous free exercise cases]."57 The law
provides that when a free exercise claim is asserted, the "Government
may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it dem-
onstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in fur-
therance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est."58 These specific words of the standard are fairly clear cut, but
the meaning of the test is far from obvious. 59
50. Id.
51. Emp. Div., Dep't of Human Res., Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
52. Id. at 888-89.
53. Id. at 878-79.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). Note that this law is good law in terms of its applica-
tion to federal law, but does not apply to state laws. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000).
56. § 2000bb(b)(1).
57. S. Rep. 103-111, at 9 (1993).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
59. See discussion infra Part III.
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III. GONZALES V. 0 CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICIENTE
UNIAO DO VEGETAL
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Benficiente Uniao Do Vegetal60 is the most
recent Supreme Court decision regarding the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld a preliminary
injunction enjoining the federal government from enforcing the Con-
trolled Substance Act6l against a religious group that was using
hoasca, a hallucinogenic drug.62 The appellees, who practiced a relig-
ion that has roots in the Amazon Rainforest, asserted RFRA as a de-
fense against the government's enforcement of the Controlled
Substances Act, which would prevent them from importing hoasca.
63
Under the Controlled Substances Act Schedules, DMT, a component of
hoasca, is a Schedule One substance. This classification means that it
is not approved for human use, even as a prescription drug.64
After a hearing, the appellees obtained a preliminary injunction in
district court to prevent enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act
under RFRA. The injunction was upheld by the 10th Circuit. 6 5 The
injunction permitted the group to use hoasca as long as it imported
the tea properly, limited possession to church members, and "particu-
larly susceptible" members were warned about the effects of the
drug.66
In the appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision to issue a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion and reviewed the legal
rulings de novo.6 7 The government had already conceded that
preventing the use of hoasca would substantially burden a sincere
practice of religion, so the only issue for review remaining under
RFRA was whether the government's interest in the enforcement of
the Controlled Substances Act was the least restrictive means of pro-
tecting a compelling government interest.6 8 The Court noted that the
burden was on the government to show that it was more likely than
not to prove at trial that it had a compelling interest in enforcing the
Controlled Substances Act.6 9
60. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
61. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
62. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
63. Id. at 423.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
65. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 423.
66. Id. at 427. The injunction further provided that if the government believed that
the drug had negatively affected the health of church members or the DMT levels
were too high, the government could apply for an "expedited determination" as to
whether the church's license should be suspended or removed. Id.
67. Id. at 428.
68. Id. at 426.
69. Id. at 429-30.
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The Court found that the government's arguments could not with-
stand the compelling interest test.70 The government had argued in
district court that it had a compelling interest in the uniform enforce-
ment of the Controlled Substances Act to prevent the distribution of
the drug outside of the church, to protect the safety of church mem-
bers, and to prevent the violation of a treaty, the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances.71 The government's basis for the first argu-
ment was that the Controlled Substance Act is a closed regulatory sys-
tem from which no exemptions should be granted unless specifically
provided for in the Act because it would not be possible to "cabin" the
exceptions, and further, granting the exceptions would communicate
to the public that Schedule One drugs are not dangerous.72 The Court
found that the government could not show that the Controlled Sub-
stances Act was the least restrictive means since it already included a
regulatory exemption from the act for Native Americans who used pe-
yote, which is also a Schedule One drug, as part of religious prac-
tices. 7 3 Thus, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to
consider an individual exemption, only in the light of that exemption,
and not in light of its larger effects on precedent.7 4
The Court refused to reexamine the district court's finding that the
overall health risks of importing hoasca were in equipoise with the
government's interest in enforcing the Controlled Substances Act. 75
The Court refused to overturn the injunction on this ground because it
found that the government has the burden of proof.76
Finally, the Court held that the government's argument regarding
the violation the Convention on Psychotropic Substances was not suf-
ficient to show that the government had a compelling interest in en-
forcing the law, even though it noted that the use of hoasca was
probably prohibited under this treaty.77 Overall, the Court concluded
70. Id. at 438.
71. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Benficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 426
(2006). The lower court weighed the facts as to the extent of risk hoasca
presented when it came to health risks and distribution risks and found that the
risks were "in equipoise." The Supreme Court declined to revisit those findings.
72. Id. at 430.
73. Id. at 433. But see Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 919-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that there is support for the idea
that the Native American usage of peyote is grounded in something other than a
mere religious exemption). Further, Native Americans, as a group, have been
provided with recognition of special rights not available to the rest of the general
population as recognized by the Native Americans Religious Freedom Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 1996. (2000).
74. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 430-32.
75. Id. at 427-28.
76. Id. at 429-30.
77. Id. at 437-38.
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that the government did not have any compelling interest which justi-
fied prohibiting the use of hoasca in religious ceremonies.
78
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Historical Treatment of the Compelling Interest Test in
the Free Exercise Context
As previously discussed, the goal of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act was to restore the standard of review in free exercise cases
to what it was prior to Smith. The language of the Act codifies the
previous standard of review. However, a closer examination of free
exercise precedent reveals that a claim asserting the right to use an
otherwise illegal drug should not have been successful. First, this sec-
tion will discuss the possibility that the compelling interest test actu-
ally provides for a carveout in health and welfare cases where the
court is unlikely to find for a claimant. Second, this section will
demonstrate why a free exercise claim for drug usage outside of peyote
usage should always fail due to unfavorable drug-related precedent.
1. Health and Welfare Carveouts in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Both Sherbert v. Verner7 9 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 0 which set out
the compelling interest test prescribed by RFRA, provide more specific
indications as to which kinds of exemptions based on free exercise
should be granted and which kinds should not be granted.81 The
cases specifically set forth areas in which the government is not free to
take action and areas where the government may regulate individu-
als, in spite of free exercise rights.S2 Sherbert specifically points out
situations where the government is not allowed to regulate.8 3 In
Sherbert, the Court noted that the government may not regulate "re-
ligious beliefs as such," "compel affirmation of a repugnant belief," dis-
criminate against those with a specific belief, or use taxes to prevent a
particular religious view from being propagated.8 4 Both Sherbert and
Yoder point to Cantwell v. Connecticut85 as an example of a case
where an exemption should be granted.8 6 In Cantwell, the Court held
that it was unacceptable to prevent the pronouncement of an offensive
religious view where those listening found it "highly offensive" and
78. Id. at 439.
79. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
80. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81. Id. at 219-20; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03.
82. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03.
83. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
84. Id.
85. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
86. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
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that it was unacceptable to regulate religious speech differently than
other types of speech.8 7
Sherbert and Yoder also pointed out areas where government regu-
lation is acceptable by listing a second group of cases.8 8 Whereas the
first group of cases dealt with actions having little or no effect on the
well-being of individuals, the second group included all of the cases
that regulate such matters.8 9 As Yoder pointed out, certain activities
"even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the
States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote health,
safety, and general welfare, or [by] the Federal Government in the
exercise of its delegated powers."90 Sherbert similarly noted that
cases where the free exercise claimant did not prevail were cases
where the regulation prevented actions that "posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order."9 1 Both cases cited Reynolds v.
United States9 2 and Prince v. Massachusetts9 3 as examples.
94
Prince is indicative of the fact that the Court, at the time of both
Sherbert and Yoder believed health and safety concerns overrode free
exercise claims. In Prince, the Supreme Court upheld a child labor
law in the face of a free exercise challenge. 9 5 The law forbade boys
under twelve and girls under eighteen from selling merchandise in a
public place. 96 In the case, a nine-year-old girl had engaged in the
prohibited offense of selling merchandise in a public place by offering
religious reading materials for sale. 97 The Court upheld the law and
noted that its goal was to protect children from the effects of "propa-
gandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other mat-
ters" which caused "situations . . . wholly inappropriate for children,
especially of tender years, to face." 98 Thus, it seems that the Court
believed that the purpose of the law was to protect children from the
harm they might experience while proffering viewpoints. Since the
87. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306-07, 309-11.
88. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03.
89. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03.
90. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. Also note that subsequent to this remark, Yoder explains
that there are certain "areas" where conduct is protected by the free exercise
clause and then provides examples, including Sherbert, Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), to illus-
trate types of religious practices that are subject to protection. Id. This contrast
seems to substantially limit the possibility of a free exercise exception to cases
that are more analogous to the category that includes Sherbert.
91. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
92. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
93. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
94. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
95. Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-70.
96. Id. at 160-61.
97. Id. at 159-63.
98. Id. at 169-70.
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law only prevented children from selling materials, children, who be-
cause of their religious beliefs, gave away religious materials or gave
lectures about religion on the public streets could continue their activ-
ities unhampered while still exposed to the same harm. 99 Overall, it
seems that the citation of this case shows just how seriously the Court
in both Sherbert and Yoder regarded a state's interest in health and
safety concerns, even to the extent of construing laws beyond their
original meaning (preventing child labor) and stretching them to pro-
tect a totally unrelated interest (protecting children from the results
of proffering religious beliefs).
Sherbert also relied upon Jacobsen v. Massachusetts10 0 as a case
demonstrative of the situation where the government has the author-
ity to regulate in spite of a free exercise claim. This case does not
directly deal with balancing a free exercise claim against a regulation,
but the fact that it was cited in this context indicates that the Court
believed that if this claim were asserted as a free exercise claim, it
would fail. In Jacobsen, the Court refused to allow a defendant to be
exempted from a state law which required vaccination for smallpox.1O1
The defendant could not provide any reason that he should be ex-
empted from the law, except that it "was in derogation of the rights
secured ... by the Preamble to the Constitution" and "tended to sub-
vert and defeat the purposes of the Constitution as declared in its Pre-
amble."1o 2 In response to the defendant's assertion that under the
Constitution, he had the inherent liberty "to care for his own body and
health in such way as seems to him best," the Court noted that this
liberty is not an "absolute right" and is subject to "manifold restraints
... for the common good." 10 3 The Court concluded that it was consis-
tent with the Constitution to allow the State of Massachusetts to re-
quire vaccination when it was necessary for public health reasons.l0 4
The fact that the Court cited this case indicates that the Court consid-
ered public health a sufficient reason to uphold a law in the face of an
individual's assertion of a free exercise right.
The Court's citation of these cases in Sherbert and Yoder shows
that the new compelling interest test still provided for government in-
terests to override the interests of individuals where public health is
involved.105 Thus, the Court likely intended for the compelling inter-
99. Id. at 160-61. Really, all that would have been necessary to avoid the enforce-
ment of the law would be for the child to stop requesting payment in exchange for
the religious literature.
100. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
101. Id. at 12-13.
102. Id. at 13-14.
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 25-27.
105. In fact, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the passage in Sherbert (that is discussed in
subsection III.A.1) as meaning that drug laws fall "within the category of cases
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est test only to be applied in such a way that gave due respect to pub-
lic health laws as written by the government in a free exercise case as
long as they were sensibly written (or had a legitimate purpose). Per-
haps the Court's intent was to communicate that a health interest is a
compelling interest where less restrictive means are not necessary.
However, the later interpretation of free exercise precedent in 0 Cen-
tro did not provide any deference to the health and safety interest
which the government asserted to support summarily upholding drug
laws. The Court, instead of using the "directions" as to how the test
should apply that are laid out in both Sherbert and Yoder, used only
the language of the test and supplied that language with its own
meaning.
2. Treatment of Drug Cases Under the Compelling Interest Test
Neither the Supreme Court, nor the Federal Circuit Courts had,
prior to 0 Centro, applied the compelling interest test to a free exer-
cise claim to grant an exemption to the Controlled Substances Act. 0
Centro seems to be an anomaly in this sense. The Court assumed that
since an administrative exemption existed for Native Americans using
peyote (which is on Schedule One), there was no reason to believe that
the other substances on Schedule One should be prohibited from use
for religious purposes because they are manifestly unsafe. 106 This as-
sumption seems misguided because the exemption does not necessa-
rily have anything to do with the safety of the drug, but is instead
based upon recognition of Native American sovereignty. 10 7
Some element of Native American sovereignty has existed histori-
cally since the inception of the United States.1 0 8 Traditionally, the
courts have viewed Native Americans as a group with rights that are
distinct from those of the general population of American citizens.10 9
Modern cases, such as Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 110 have recog-
nized this. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court rejected a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim based on a tribe's grant of dispa-
cited in Sherbert which require governmental regulation." Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th Cir. 1967).
106. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
436-37 (2006).
107. See Thomas J. Bannon Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the Na-
tive American Church: a Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and
Establishment Issues Raised by the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. IN-
DAN L. REV. 475, 506-07 (1998). See also Native American Church of New York
v. United States 468 F. Supp. 1247, 1249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 633 F.2d (2d.
Cir. 1980) (distinguishing an exemption for peyote from an exemption for all
other drugs).
108. Bannon, supra note 107 at 487-88.
109. Id. at 497-90 (describing John Marshall's interpretation as to the "strange sover-
eignty" of Native Americans).
110. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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rate rights to male and female members by noting that the Indian
court had the rights to make such a determination, even if it violated
the Fourteenth Amendment."'l Thus, the Court has concluded that
Native Americans have qualitatively different rights as tribal mem-
bers. 1 12 For this reason, it seems logical that they be permitted to
choose to use peyote, a practice which Native American tribes have
sanctioned for thousands of years, based on a recognition of their
sovereignty.
The exemption for peyote, however, has been subject to attack by
those who are not Native Americans, but also wish to use it. Due to
Equal Protection issues, some federal courts have permitted others
who practice Native American religions, but are not Native Americans
to use peyote. 113 This should be viewed as separate from legislatures
actually granting exemptions to other drugs.
The treatment of all other Schedule One drugs in free exercise
cases has been consistent-courts have consistently concluded that
free exercise leaves no room for an exemption permitting drug use,
even if the practice is central to the religion and based on a firmly held
religious belief.114 Prior to Smith, free exercise drug cases had not
reached the Supreme Court. Also, in practically all of the lower court
cases, the court found that drug use was not "central" to the religion,
so the compelling interest/least restrictive means test was not usually
applied. For example, in Native American Church of New York v.
United States,115 in response to a free exercise claim that psychedelic
drugs should be permitted as part of religious worship, the federal dis-
trict court held that, due to Congress' judgment that the particular
drugs had "'a high potential for abuse,' 'no currently accepted medical
use,' and 'a lack of accepted safety for use' even under supervision,"'
the court would not grant a free exercise exemption.1 16 The court fur-
ther explained that the Congress' conclusions regarding the danger
posed by the drugs "leave no room for a Court to substitute its judg-
ment for that of Congress."117
111. Bannon, supra note 107 at 497-98 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978)).
112. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71 (noting that that although tribes are not
treated as foreign nations, they are treated as "quasi-sovereign" nations that "are
in many ways foreign" to U.S. governmental entities).
113. See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991); Native American
Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247, (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af/d,
633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980).
114. See Native American Church, 468 F. Supp.at 1249; Leary v. United States, 383
F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967) (distinguishing the regulatory exemption for Native
American usage of peyote from a claim for marijuana usage).
115. Native Amer. Church of N.Y. v. United States, 468 F.Supp 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
116. Id. at 1249 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (1970)).
117. Id.
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In State v. Bullard,l18 which the North Carolina Supreme Court
heard between the Sherbert and Yoder decisions, a non-Native Ameri-
can litigant asserted a free exercise right to use both peyote and mari-
juana. 119 The Court, although it doubted the sincerity of the
claimant's religion, stated that even if the claimant's beliefs were sin-
cere, he would not have received a free exercise exemption to the Con-
trolled Substances Act.120 The Court explained its reasoning as
follows:
Even if he were sincere, the First Amendment could not protect him. It is true
that this amendment permits a citizen complete freedom of religion. He may
belong to any church or to no church and may believe whatever he will, how-
ever fantastic, illogical or unreasonable, but nowhere does it authorize him in
the exercise of his religion to commit acts which constitute threats to the pub-
lic safety, morals, peace and order.
1 2 1
What is clear from both of these cases is that Federal Courts have
not contemplated allowing free exercise to mean drug use. Notably,
both of these cases flatly reject exceptions to the drug laws without
balancing the harm of allowing the drug usage use versus the relig-
ious importance of the drug. Thus, even if someone purports to use a
Schedule One drug to exercise a rite which he firmly and sincerely
believes is central to his religious practices, he would not be able to
use it under this precedent, unless perhaps, it were peyote.
B. The Supreme Court Should Have Acknowledged the
Government's Interest in Preventing Numerous
Exemptions
The Supreme Court did not give weight to the effect on precedent
in permitting an exemption to the Controlled Substances Act. The Su-
preme Court prescribed an approach that only weighs the advantages
and disadvantages of granting an exemption in the particular situa-
tion, but not the effect of the exemption on precedent.122 If this case
were viewed as merely granting an exemption in a particular case,
there would be no problem. However, there are other similarly situ-
ated groups which will assert similar claims and are more likely to get
an exemption due to the existence of 0 Centro as precedent. If enough
groups gain a similar exemption, the cumulative effects are likely to
be more than the sum of their parts and seriously undermine the gov-
ernment's ability to enforce the Controlled Substances Act.
118. 148 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967).
119. Id. at 567.
120. Id. at 568-69.
121. Id.
122. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430
(2006).
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The Supreme Court approached a similar issue in United States v.
Lee, 12 3 where the Court refused to grant a free exercise exemption be-
cause of the cumulative effect it would have on precedent.12 4 Lee, an
Amish carpenter, insisted that he should be granted a religious ex-
emption to paying social security and unemployment taxes.12 5 The
Court refused to grant the exemption, even though it had determined
that the law did interfere with Lee's free exercise rights. 1 2 6 The Court
reasoned that granting the exemption would create precedent that
would justify religious groups gaining exemptions from paying income
tax. 127 This could, in turn, potentially destroy the entire tax sys-
tem.128 In this situation, allowing just one employer to gain an ex-
emption would not be problematic, but the precedent created because
of the decision would be destructive because a large number of people
could use it to avoid paying taxes:
If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt
from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not func-
tion if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief. (cita-
tions omitted).
1 2 9
The overall problem is, as William P. Marshall has noted, that the
government's interest is minimized only when considered in the con-
text of a particular case. 130 As James E. Ryan explained, "[tihe state
may thus simultaneously not have even a reasonable interest in deny-
ing a particular exemption to a certain law or regulation and a com-
pelling interest in denying a large number of exemptions to that same
law or regulation."131 This means that when the Court weighs only
the government's interest in only granting one exemption, the Court
really has not considered the government's entire interest. Thus, al-
lowing one isolated group to use hoasca does not cause much harm,
but if this is the only harm which the Court considers, the real extent
of the harm has not been taken into account. The precedent created
by 0 Centro likely has the potential to eviscerate the Controlled Sub-
stances Act if many groups receive exemptions to use hoasca and other
drugs that are otherwise illegal.
123. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
124. Id. at 259-60.
125. Id. at 254-55.
126. Id. at 257-59.
127. Id. at 259-60.
128. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982)
129. Id. at 260.
130. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308, 312 (1991).
131. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclas-
tic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1423 (1992).
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There are many foreseeable consequences resulting from the prece-
dent created by 0 Centro. First, this will make drug enforcement far
more difficult. If many groups have exemptions, then there will be
numerous, otherwise illegal drugs, spread over the United States,
making it more difficult to verify that the drugs are given only to the
proper people and groups. Drugs are likely to fall into the wrong
hands. Curious non-believers will be able to gain access to drugs by
feigning belief.13 2 Once the courts have handed over possession of the
drug to various churches, it will be exceedingly difficult to ensure that
only honest believers receive the drug.
Harm also results from the message that granting multiple exemp-
tions sends to the general population. If the courts have declared mul-
tiple drugs "safe enough" for certain religious groups, but not
acceptable for general usage, the classifications of these drugs as inap-
propriate for human use in Controlled Substances Act will appear un-
justified. Many will stop trusting the government's judgment and try
whatever herbal remedies they believe are best, in spite of real health
risks, because they perceive the harm to be minimal.
C. Lack of Uniformity Resulting From a Rough Balancing of
the Physical "Harm" Consideration
When district courts in the future consider whether the Controlled
Substances Act is the least restrictive means of protecting a compel-
ling government interest, they will have little guidance from the Su-
preme Court. In 0 Centro, the Supreme Court treated the issue as to
whether the harm of caused by the drug133 constitutes a compelling
government interest as a factual issue for the district court to
weigh.13 4 Since the Supreme Court has determined that, as a matter
of law, the government has no compelling interest in enforcing the
Controlled Substances Act in a uniform manner or enforcing an inter-
national treaty prohibiting hoasca, this is the only matter left for dis-
trict courts to weigh once it reaches the compelling interest test.1
35
Problematically, as evidenced by the district court opinion and the Su-
preme Court opinion, there is no distinct explanation as to how this
132. Even though the Supreme Court has noted that there is not a diversion risk for
hoasca, there is certainly a large community in the U.S. that is interested in us-
ing hoasca and would likely try it if presented with the opportunity. See Aya-
huasca Forums Memberlist, http://forums.ayahuasca.com/phpbb/memberlist.php,
(last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
133. Both include harm in terms of physical effects and harm caused by distribution.
This section largely focuses on the physical harm. See 0 Centro Espririta
Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 418, 427 (2006).
134. Id.
135. See supra Part III.
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"harm" is measured. 136 Reading the district court opinion reveals
that there was enough evidence for a district court to hold for either
party, depending upon how the district court defined "harm."
In terms of the physical effects of the drug, it seems that the dis-
trict court was at liberty to define what exactly "harm" is and then
decide if the drug was causing too much "harm."13 7 For example, if
the district court had defined harm as a drug potentially causing hal-
lucinations,138 the court would have found for the government. If the
district court had defined harm as causing traumatic and severe brain
damage, a finding for the government would not have been possible
because there was no evidence of such damage. If, instead, the court
had defined harm as temporary or permanent mental or physical disa-
bility causing the inability to engage in productive labor, the court
may have been able to find for the government because there was
some evidence as to such effect. Since there is no precedent which
explains how to analyze the physical harm caused by drugs, a district
court is free to conclude what scientific evidence is sufficient to show
harm.
The problem was that the district court took this opportunity to
concoct its own standard of "harm." The government presented evi-
dence that hoasca had certain harmful interactions with prescription
drugs.1 39 The government also presented evidence as to mental
health problems which the drug may cause, such as psychosis. But
the religious group flatly denied that either of these effects were con-
nected to the drug.14o Finally, the government presented a hoasca
study which suggested that the drug causes cardiac irregularities in
some people, and the church countered by arguing that the cardiac
irregularities were not linked with heart disease. 14 1 In essence, the
court knows that the drug is likely causing some harm, but is faced
with problematic decision of setting the limit on how much harm is
"too much."14 2
The question as to what is sufficient evidence to show that a sub-
stance is "harmful" is not one that a district court is equipped to an-
swer, especially in a case like 0 Centro where the court acknowledged
136. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 427-28; 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v.
Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1262 (D.N.M. 2002).
137. See 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 429 (noting that the Supreme Court reviewed the deci-
sion to issue an injunction for abuse of discretion).
138. See 0 Centro, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
139. Id. at 1259.
140. Id. at 1260-61.
141. Id. at 1261.
142. Note also that the court examined the potential harm created by diversion of the
drug in much the same way-by deciding how much harm is "too much." See id.
at 1262-66.
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that there was little scientific knowledge regarding the drug.143 An-
swering the question would require the judge to render a personal
opinion, rather than an interpretation of precedent. The judgment as
to what is "harmful" generally originates in public opinion and scien-
tific knowledge and is then defined by legislation. Almost all stan-
dards regarding harm are created in this way. For example, cities set
their speed limits after roughly determining what speeds they believe
to be harmful. It seems ridiculous for a court to hear scientific evi-
dence regarding whether a thirty-seven mile per hour speed limit is
not harmful, and okay for some people, even though the legal speed
limit is thirty-five. Traditionally, this sort of unguided examination of
public safety interests has been a function of legislative bodies.
In order to guarantee a certain uniformity of result, Congress
should provide guidelines as to how district courts should approach
the concept of harm. Congress, for example, could pass a law requir-
ing that there be no exemption if the drug causes hallucinations or
renders a person unable to drive. Then the inquiry into "harm" would
be more of a guided factual inquiry and less of a public policy question.
V. CONCLUSION
The overall message of 0 Centro is that religious groups can exact
exemptions to federal law which allow them to use otherwise illegal
drugs, if they can show that the drug is central to practicing honestly
and sincerely held religious beliefs and the drug is not "too harmful."
However, precedent suggests that under the compelling interest test
which RFRA prescribes, courts should not grant an exemption to neu-
tral health and safety and drugs laws because the government has a
compelling interest in enforcing this sort of legislation. 14 4 The fact
that the Court has allowed this exemption creates an opening for
many more exemptions, which may, in turn, substantially destroy the
Controlled Substances Act.1 45 Since the Supreme Court has chosen
this path, lower courts are left with the lone question as to whether a
drug is "too harmful" for an exemption to be granted once they arrive
at the final step of the compelling interest test.146 The Supreme Court
left the concept of harm undefined, and thus left federal district courts
to act as legislatures by making normative judgments as to what
harm is, which will lead to the inconsistent enforcement of the Con-
trolled Substances Act.1 47 The simplest solution for these problems
143. Id. at 1256.
144. See discussion supra section IV.A.
145. See discussion supra section IV.B.
146. This occurs after the court has already determined that the belief is central to the
religion and sincerely and honestly held. See supra section II.A.
147. See discussion supra section IV.C.
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would be for Congress to legislatively provide that RFRA does not ap-
ply to the Controlled Substances Act. In this way, the Court would be
rendered incapable of issuing another decision similar to 0 Centro.
